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Abstract: This paper examines the implications of principles-based versus rules-based accounting standards, 
specifically as related to corporate governance. The debate over the benefits and consequences of principles-
based versus rules-based accounting standards has ensued for decades. However, comparing the approaches 
in a real-life, practical setting has proved challenging. Principles-based standards require increased 
managerial judgement, which should necessitate the need for effective oversight by those responsible for 
corporate governance. This paper examines corporate governance surrounding the implementation of 
guidance under a principles-based piece of guidance that was subsequently supplemented with additional 
rules-based guidance in order to better enforce the intent of the original principles-based guidance. Many 
firms needed the subsequent rules-based guidance in order to comply with the original intent of the 
principles-based guidance. While firms complying with both the principles-based and rules-based guidance in 
this study tend to exhibit characteristics of stronger corporate governance, that does not necessarily indicate 
that stronger corporate governance determines compliance with principles-based standards. These findings 
should be of interest to practitioners and regulators, and are important given the ongoing movement toward 
principles-based standards. The SEC is exploring whether existing prescriptive guidance in Regulation S-K 
should be replaced with a principles-based framework for financial disclosures (SEC, 2016). This paper 
capitalizes on a unique setting to provide a fresh analysis in the debate between principles-based and rules-
based accounting standards.  
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Introduction 
The debate over the benefits and consequences of principles-based versus rules-based accounting 
standards has ensued for decades. This issue remains relevant today given the new principles-
orientated guidance in ASC Topic 606, Revenue from Contracts with Customers and ASC Topic 842, 
Leases. Following the passage of The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the SEC directed the FASB to 
“more consistently develop standards on a principles-based or objectives-oriented basis” (SEC 2003a, 
4). Compared to rules-based standards, principles-based standards leave more room for varying 
interpretation, and are characterized by clearly defined objectives, fewer scope exceptions, and less 
implementation guidance. The SEC identified SFAS No. 143, Accounting for Asset Retirement 
Obligations (AROs) as one of the earliest accounting standards with principles-based qualities. This 
context (ARO guidance) is utilized in this paper in order to examine the implications of principles-
based versus rules-based accounting standards. Given the unique implementation related to this 
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guidance, this context provides a rare opportunity to examine principles-based versus rules-based 
standards. 
SFAS No. 143 was effective in 2003 and provided guidance for obligations associated with the 
retirement of long-lived assets (FASB, 2001). AROs are measured at fair value when a reasonable 
estimate can be made, and are recognized in the period incurred. AROs require significant judgment 
by management concerning the timing, measurement, and potential settlement dates. Formal guidance 
was required in order to promote consistent treatment given the diversity in then-existing accounting 
practices. Upon adoption, entities recognized a cumulative ARO liability, a related asset and 
accumulated depreciation, and a cumulative-effect adjustment to income under then-APB Opinion No. 
20, Accounting Changes.  
In 2004, the FASB identified diversity in the adoption of SFAS No. 143 and noncompliance with its 
underlying principles, particularly with respect to “conditional” AROs (FASB, 2005). Conditional 
AROs result when the timing of the asset retirement or method of settlement is dependent on future 
events that may or may not occur. Some entities properly incorporated uncertainty into the estimate of 
fair value; others incorrectly applied the “probable and reasonably estimable” guidance under then-
SFAS No. 5, Accounting for Contingencies (now ASC Topic 450). Soon after, the FASB issued 
Interpretation No. 47 (FIN 47), Accounting for Conditional Asset Retirement Obligations that was 
effective in 2005. FIN 47 clarified the accounting principles for particular types of AROs already set 
forth in SFAS No. 143. FIN 47 resulted in the recognition of additional long-term liabilities and a 
cumulative effect adjustment to income for previously unrecognized obligations. In effect, many firms 
needed two chances to theoretically comply with the original intent of SFAS No. 143. It should be 
noted that accounting for AROs now resides in ASC Topic 410, Asset Retirement and Environmental 
Obligations. 
Principles-based standards remain integral to the U.S. financial reporting environment and require 
management to exercise greater judgement during the implementation and application of such 
standards, which may necessitate the need for effective oversight by those responsible for corporate 
governance. This article provides insights into these issues by examining the adoption of SFAS No. 
143. While findings suggest that firms reporting ARO adjustments upon adoption of the standard tend 
to exhibit characteristics of stronger corporate governance, that does not necessarily indicate that 
stronger corporate governance determines compliance with principles-based standards. 
 
Methodology 
The 2003 Fortune 500 was used to examine managements’ initial ARO adoption decisions under 
SFAS No. 143, and the 2005 Fortune 500 was used to examine the adoption of FIN 47. The samples 
were adjusted to exclude financial institutions and firms lacking data mainly due to mergers, 
acquisitions and bankruptcy. Financial institutions are excluded due to their unique financial 
characteristics and oversight by regulatory bodies. This results in a subtotal of 339 firms. An 
additional 47 firms that reached the Fortune 500 in 2005 were added to this sample. The final samples 
comprise the same 386 firms for 2003 and 2005.  
The 2003 10-K report for each firm was examined to determine whether the SFAS No. 143 adoption 
decision was “material” or “not material.” A decision is classified as material if management 
discussed the adoption of SFAS No. 143 in the footnotes and recognized an adjustment to the income 
statement and balance sheet. A decision was coded as not material if management disclosed that the 
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issuance of SFAS No. 143 did not have a material effect on the financial statements, or was silent as to 
the new standard. A similar examination was performed for FIN 47 for 2005. 
Table 1 summarizes the ARO adoption decisions of the sample firms for 2003 and 2005, and reflects 
comparable findings between the two periods. Of the 386 firms in each sample year, 104 (27 percent) 
reported an adjustment upon adoption of SFAS No. 143. In addition, 94 firms (24 percent) reported an 
adjustment upon adoption of FIN 47, which is consistent with the FASB’s concerns over the lack of 
compliance with SFAS No. 143. The industry composition of firms recognizing new AROs in each 
year indicates that firms in the extractive (12), transportation (13), and electric, gas and sanitary 
services (38) industries comprise over 60 percent (63/104) of firms reporting an adoption adjustment 
in 2003. In 2005 these three industries comprise 52 percent (49/94) of firms reporting an adjustment. It 
should also be noted that 53 firms reported ARO adjustments in both 2003 and 2005. 
Table 1 
 
1  Represents firms that recorded ARO adjustments upon adoption of SFAS No. 143. 
2  Represents firms that recorded ARO adjustments upon adoption of FIN 47. 
3  Represents firms that recorded ARO adjustments upon adoption of both SFAS No. 143 and FIN 47. 
The following corporate governance variables are then considered: 
Variable Definition 
BOARD Number of individuals on the board of directors. 
INSIDEDIR% Number of inside directors, divided by the total number of directors. 
INSIDEOWN% Percentage of voting shares owned by officers, directors, and other defined individuals. 
AC_SIZE Number of directors on the audit committee. 
AC_EXPERT A binary variable equal to 1 if all audit committee members are designated as financial experts, and 
0 otherwise. 
BIG4 A binary variable equal to 1 if a company is audited by a Big 4 auditor, and 0 otherwise. 
Data for the variables BOARD, INSIDEDIR%, INSIDEOWN%, AC_SIZE and AC_EXPERT is 
obtained from Corporate Library and BoardEx, and supplemented by firm 10-K Reports and Proxy 
Statements. Data for BIG4 is obtained from Compustat. In general, corporate governance effectiveness 
should be positively related to BOARD, AC_SIZE, AC_EXPERT and BIG4, and negatively related to 
INSIDEDIR% and INSIDEOWN% (Zhang et al., 2007; Lin and Hwang, 2010). 
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Findings 
Corporate Governance Characteristics 
Each variable is first examined to identify any significant shifts in corporate governance mechanisms 
between 2003 and 2005. In these untabulated findings, there are no statistically significant differences 
in means for five of the variables (BOARD, INSIDEOWN%, AC_SIZE, AC_EXPERT, and BIG4) 
during the period. However, the 2005 firms have fewer insiders on the board of directors 
(INSIDEDIR%) compared to 2003 (mean of 21 percent vs. 27 percent, respectively), and the 
difference is statistically significant. This change is related to rules established by the New York Stock 
Exchange and NASDAQ in 2002 requiring boards of listed companies to have a majority of 
independent directors (SEC, 2003b).  
Adoption of SFAS No. 143 
The next analysis examines each corporate governance variable in conjunction with managements’ 
decisions when SFAS No. 143 was adopted. Recall that 104 of the 386 firms recorded an adjustment 
upon adoption and are classified as “material” while the other 282 firms concluded that the impact was 
“not material.” Table 2 presents descriptive information and tests of the differences for each variable 
between the two groups. The findings indicate statistically significant differences in means for five of 
the six corporate governance attributes. More specifically, “material” firms have larger boards 
(BOARD -- mean of 11.45 members vs. 10.70 members), fewer insiders on the board of directors 
(INSIDEDIR% -- mean of 21 percent vs. 29 percent), lower stock ownership by insiders 
(INSIDEOWN% -- mean of 3 percent vs. 10 percent), larger audit committees (AC_SIZE -- mean of 
4.52 members vs. 4.18 members), and a higher number of audit committees consisting solely of 
financial experts (AC_EXPERT -- mean of 26 percent vs. 13 percent). Substantially all firms in the 
sample were audited by the Big 4. These findings suggest that firms reporting ARO adjustments upon 
adoption of SFAS No. 143 have characteristics of stronger corporate governance.  
Table 2 
 
*, ** Difference is statistically significant at p < 0.05 and < 0.01, respectively.   
1 Represents firms that recorded ARO adjustments upon adoption of SFAS No. 143 (see Table 1). 
2 Represents firms that did not record ARO adjustments upon adoption of SFAS No. 143 (see Table 1). 
3 Differences in means for the continuous variables BOARD through AC_SIZE are based on t-tests. 
Differences in the binary variables AC_EXPERT and BIG4 are based on the Wilcoxon Rank-Sum (Z) 
Test. 
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Adoption of FIN 47   
Fornaro and Huang (2012) suggest that the issuance of FIN 47 was a second attempt for companies to 
comply with the original provisions of SFAS No. 143. Table 3 presents descriptive information and 
tests of the differences for each variable upon adoption of FIN 47, partitioned between the 94 firms 
with an adjustment to the financial statements (material) and the remaining 292 firms (not material). 
The differences in means for each corporate governance variable are in the same direction and are 
statistically significant for the same five corporate governance variables as with SFAS No. 143. 
Specifically, “material” firms have larger boards, fewer insider board members, lower insider stock 
ownership, larger audit committees, and a higher number of audit committees consisting solely of 
financial experts. 
Table 3 
 
*, ** Difference is statistically significant at p < 0.05 and p < 0.01, respectively.   
1 Represents firms that recorded ARO adjustments upon adoption of FIN 47 (see Table 1). 
2 Represents firms that did not record ARO adjustments upon adoption of FIN 47 (see Table 1). 
3 Differences in means for the continuous variables BOARD through AC_SIZE are based on t-tests. 
Differences in the binary variables AC_EXPERT and BIG4 are based on the Wilcoxon Rank-Sum (Z) 
Test. 
Noncompliance with SFAS No. 143 Adoption 
As previously discussed, Table 1 provides evidence supporting the FASB’s concerns over the lack of 
compliance with SFAS No. 143. More specifically, 94 firms recognized AROs under FIN 47 that 
should have been reported two years earlier. Of these 94 firms, 53 recognized adjustments in both 
2003 and 2005. In other words, these 53 firms needed two attempts to comply with the original intent 
of SFAS No. 143. The remaining 41 firms (94 - 53) recorded cumulative adjustments only in 2005. 
This suggests that the corporate governance of firms with previously unreported AROs did not ensure 
adherence with the provisions of the principles-based standard.  
Table 4 presents descriptive information and examines whether significant differences in corporate 
governance variables exist between firms that originally complied with SFAS No. 143 compared to 
noncompliant firms. The latter represents the 94 firms that reported additional AROs under FIN 47, 
partitioned into two groups: (1) the 53 firms that recorded AROs in both 2003 and 2005 (Group 1), 
and (2) the remaining 41 firms (94 - 53) that cumulatively recorded AROs only upon adoption of FIN 
47 (Group 2). Compliant firms represent the 51 firms (104 - 53) that adopted SFAS No. 143 in 2003 
and made no additional adjustments in 2005. Variables are based on 2003 data. 
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The findings in Table 4 indicate that the corporate governance variables were not statistically different 
between compliant firms and both groups of noncompliant firms. In other words, individual elements 
of corporate governance were essentially the same whether firms complied with SFAS No. 143 or not. 
Table 4 
 
 
^ There is no statistically significant difference in the corporate governance variable between the 
groups. 
1 Represents 51 firms (104 - 53) that recorded ARO adjustments upon adoption of SFAS No. 143 in 
2003 and no further adjustments in 2005 (see Table 1). 
2 Represents 53 firms that recorded ARO adjustments upon adoption of SFAS No. 143 in 2003 and FIN 
47 in 2005 (see Table 1). 
3 Represents 41 firms (94 - 53) that recorded ARO adjustments only upon adoption of FIN 47 in 2005.  
4 Differences in means for the continuous variables BOARD through AC_SIZE are based on t-tests. 
Differences in the binary variables AC_EXPERT and BIG4 are based on the Wilcoxon Rank-Sum (Z) 
Test. 
 
Conclusion 
The discussion of principles-based versus rules-based accounting standards has been ongoing for 
years. This article examines elements of corporate governance for a sample of Fortune 500 firms at 
the time that a principles-based standard (SFAS No. 143) became effective. A large number of firms 
did not comply with the standard’s underlying principles: some firms either delayed initial recognition 
of AROs until FIN 47 was issued, or recorded obligations under both SFAS No. 143 and FIN 47. 
Firms reporting ARO adjustments upon adoption of the standards appear to exhibit characteristics of 
stronger corporate governance, however, it does not appear that stronger corporate governance ensured 
compliance with the principles-based standard. This is important given the ongoing movement toward 
principles-based standards. In fact, the SEC is exploring whether existing prescriptive guidance in 
Regulation S-K should be replaced with a principles-based framework for financial disclosures (SEC, 
2016). Accordingly, the need for even greater oversight by those responsible for corporate governance 
will be an essential factor for success in a principles-based accounting environment. 
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